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1965] RECENT CASES 123
NEGLIGENCE - ARCHITECT'S LIABILITY - AN INVITEE
MAY SEEK DAMAGES FROM AN ARCHITECT FOR IN-
JURIES DUE TO A CONSTRUCTION DEFECT PATENT
TO THE OWNER OF THE PREMISES AFTER THE
OWNER HAS ACCEPTED THE WORK. Montijo v. Swift
(Cal. App. 1963).
Kenneth Swift, an architect, contracted with Western Greyhound
Lines to provide services in connection with the remodeling of por-
tions of a Los Angeles bus depot owned by Greyhound. The re-
modeling included retiling the walls of a stairway pursuant to
Swift's plans and specifications. An existing hand rail was removed,
the tiling was completed, and the hand rail was replaced in its
original position. The height of the rail was proper, but its length
was such that the end of the hand rail was positioned directly above
a point eight inches from the front edge of the bottom step.1 To a
person descending the stairs, however, the short hand rail and the
angle of the tile on the wall created an illusion that the hand rail
extended beyond the edge of the bottom step.
Twenty-one months after Greyhound had accepted Swift's work
an elderly woman, a business invitee of Greyhound's, fell while de-
scending the stairs, and was injured. She brought an action for neg-
ligence, naming both Greyhound and Swift as defendants. The jury
returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and against both defend-
ants. The trial court granted Swift's motions' for a judgment not-
withstanding the verdict and for a new trial, and plaintiff appealed.
Held: reversed as to the judgment notwithstanding the verdict;
affirmed as to the new trial. Swift's duty to exercise ordinary care
extended to the plaintiff. Montinjo v. Swift, 219 Cal. App. 2d 351,
33 Cal. Rptr. 133 (1963).
In the Montijo case the court offered the following rule as the
authority for its decision:
Under the existing status of the law, an architect who plans and
supervises construction work, as an independent contractor, is under
a duty to exercise ordinary care in the course thereof for the pro-
tection of any person who foreseeably and with reasonable certainty
may be injured by his failure to do so, even though such injury
i As a result, the handrail was several inches shorter than the length required by
Los ANGELE.S, CAL. MuNIciPAL CODE § 91.3305(g) (1958): "All stairway rail-
ings shall extend not less than two feet, six inches, or more than two feet, ten
inches above the tread nosing and shall extend to within one-half tread of the
full length of each flight"
2 Western Greyhound Lines' motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict
was overruled. This was affirmed on separate appeal. Montijo v. Western Grey-
hound Lines, 219 Cal. App. 2d 342, 33 Cal. Rptr. 184 (1963).
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may occur after his work has been accepted by the person engaging
his services.3
It should be noted that this rule makes no distinction between patent
and latent defects,' despite the fact that not one of the cases cited by
the court as authority5 for this statement held an independent con-
tractor' liable in situations where the injuries to the plaintiff oc-
curred after the independent contractor had completed the job and
the defects causing the injuries were patent to the owner.'
In Hale v. Depaoli' a back porch railing collapsed when the plain-
tiff tenant leaned against the railing eighteen years after its con-
struction. There was evidence that the railing had been improperly
nailed by the defendant contractor when installed. The California
Supreme Court, in holding that the plaintiff had a cause of action
against the contractor, stated:
Generally speaking, after a contractor has completed a building and
it is accepted by the owner, 'he is not liable to a third person for
damages suffered by reason of the condition of the work even
though he was negligent in carrying out the contract.' . . . How-
ever, a dear exception to this rule is made where the article causing
injury is of an abnormally dangerous or noxious nature. 9
In Hale the court cited Johnston v. Long"0 as one of the authorities
for the quoted statement.1 In the Johnston case the court stated:
An exception to the general rule is that the contractor is liable if
the work done and turned over by him is so negligently defective
so as to be imminently dangerous to third persons, provided the
contractor knows, or should know of the dangerous situation
created by him, and the owner does not know of the dangerous
condition or defect, and would not discover it by reasonable inspec-
tion.12 (Emphasis added.)
3 219 Cal. App. 2d at 353, 33 Cal. Rptr. at 134-35.
4 The court failed to discuss the latent-patent distinction in its written decision even
though the point was brought to the courtes attention. Reply Brief of Respondent
Swift, p. 4.
5 219 Cal. App. 2d at 353, 33 Cal. Rptr. at 135.
6 For a discussion of the relation and duties of an architect to his employer, see 5
AM. JuR. 2D Architects § 6 (1962).
7 Chance v. Lawry's Inc., 58 Cal. 2d 368, 374 P.2d 185, 24 Cal. Rptr. 209 (1962)(defect patent to the owner, injuries sustained prior to completion of work by
independent contractor); Stewart v. Cox, 55 Cal. 2d 857, 362 P.2d 345, 13 Cal.
Rptr. 521 (1961) (defect latent to owner); Dow. v. Holly Manufacturing Co.,
49 Cal. 2d 720, 321 P.2d 736 (1958) (same); Hale v. Depaoli, 33 Cal, 2d 228,
201 P.2d 1 (1948) (same); Dahms v. General Elevator Co., 214 Cal. 733, 7
P.2d 1013 (1932) (same).
8 33 Cal. 2d 228, 201 P.2d 1 (1948).
9 Id. at 230, 201 P.2d at 2. There was no finding that an abnormally dangerous or
hazardous condition existed in the .Montijo case.
10 56 Cal. App. 2d 834, 133 P.2d 409 (1943).
1 33 Cal. 2d at 230, 201 P.2d at 2-3.
12 56 Cal. App. 2d at 837, 133 P.2d at 410-11.
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When citing Johnston the court in the Hale case omitted the ele-
ment which is emphasized in the quoted statement.13 Actually, the
omitted portion would have added little to the holding in Hale since
the facts indicated that the defect, causing the injuries to the plain-
tiff in that case, was latent to the owner of the premises. However,
it appears that as a result of the court's failure in the Hale case to
mention the requirement that the owner be unaware of the defect
and incapable of discovering it by reasonable inspection, the Cali-
fornia courts, as evidenced by the Montijo decision, have abandoned
the patent-latent distinction when determining the liability of an
independent contractor. This conclusion is inescapable even though
the court in Hale did say: "It also appears that if the railing was
improperly constructed the defect was a latent one because the nail
heads were concealed by putty and paint."14 (Emphasis added.)
In Dow v. Holly Manufacturing Company5 an independent con-
tractor was held liable for the deaths of the plaintiff's husband and
two children, caused by a defect which was latent to the owner of
the premises. Quoting Prosser," the California Supreme Court said:
The present state of the law is not altogether clear because of the
survival of so many. . exceptions, which afford an opportunity to
hold the defendant liable without stating any general rule. It ap-
pears, however, that the analogy of MacPherson v. Buick Motor
Co. is at last being accepted. Several recent decisions have placed
building contractors on the same footing as sellers of goods, and
have held them to the general standard of reasonable care for the
protection of anyone who may foreseeably be endangered by the
negligence, even after acceptance of the work." (Emphasis added.)
The words emphasized in the above quotation are similar to the
words used by the court in the Montijo case, and the only California
case that is cited in Dow, as authority for them, is the Hale case
where the defect causing the injuries to the plaintiff was latent to
the owner of the premises, as was the defect in the Dow case.'" Yet,
though the defect in the Montijo case was patent to the owner, the
court did not consider the patent-latent distinction.
In Inman v. Binghampton Housing Authority9 the architect, the
builder, and the owner of an apartment building were the defend-
ants in an action brought six years after the building had been com-
13 33 Cal. 2d at 230, 201 P.2d at 2-3.
14 Id. at 229, 201 P.2d at 2.
25 49 Cal. 2d 720, 321 P.2d 736 (1958).
IC PROSSER, TORTS 519 (2d ed. 1955). The statement has since been strengthened.
Cf. PROSSER, TORTS 695 (3d ed. 1964).
" 49 Cal. 2d at 725, 321 P.2d at 739.
38 Ibid.
'9 3 N.Y.2d 137, 143 N.E.2d 895, 164 N.Y.S.2d 699 (1957).
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pleted and. turned over to the owner. The plaintiff brought the action
to recover damages for injuries sustained by a two year old boy re-
sulting from his fall from a porch which had been constructed in
accordance with the architect's "plan and design." The New York
Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff's complaint was fatally
defective as to the architect and the builder for failure to allege a
latent defect.20 The court said:
In short, in the present case, we have nothing that is related to, or
stems from, the existence of a latent fault or hidden danger[211 in
either design or construction. The complaint reveals a one-step
stoop, two steps high along a part of its length, with no railings or
protective device around it, from which an apparently unattended
child fell. Whatever the defect, it may not be said to have been
latent, and, whatever the danger, it certainly was not hidden. That
being so, it is evident that the requirements of the MacPherson-
Buick rule have not been met .... 2
The Inman court stated that the lack of privity of contract no longer
bars a person from recovering against an architect,23 and that the
principles underlying the rule announced in McPherson v. Buick
Motor Co.2  apply in determining the liability of an architect.21
In discussing the requirements of the MacPherson rule the court
said that the emphasis has always been upon the duties of guarding
against hidden defects and of giving notice of concealed dangers;
that the presence of a latent defect or of a danger not generally
known is a condition precedent to the manufacturer's liability to
persons not in privity of contract with the manufacturer." The court
clearly stated that the same contract should apply to architects, 2
20 Ibid.
21 It would appear that even though the defect was patent to the owner of the prem-
ises, as it was in the Montijo case, the defective porch probably constituted a
"hidden danger" with respect to the two year old child. See Inman v. Binghamp-
ton Housing Authority, supra, note 20. Similarly, the optical illusion (accentuated
by the angle of the tile on the wall) which induced the belief that the hand rail
ended at the point where the stairway ended probably constituted a "hidden
danger" with respect to the plaintiff in the Montijo case.
22 3 N.Y.2d at 146, 143 N.E.2d at 900, 164 N.Y.S.2d at 705.
23 Id. at 144, 143 N.E.2d at 898, 164 N.Y.S. 2d at 703. The liability of the archi-
tect is not limited to the owner who employed him; the modern view is that
privity of contract is not a prerequisite to liability. 5 Am. JuR. 2d Architects §
25 (1962).
24 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). In this well-known case a retail dealer
sold a car to the plaintiff who was injured when the defective wood from which
one of the wheel spokes had been manufactured failed and the car collapsed. It
appears that the defect was latent as to the retail dealer and the plaintiff, but with
reference to the manufacturer of the car the court in the McPherson case stated:
"There is evidence, however, that its (the wooden spokes'] defects could have been
discovered by reasonable inspection, and that inspection was omitted." MacPherson
v. Buick Motor Co., supra at 384, 111 N.E. at 1051.
25 3 N.Y.2d at 144-45, 143 N.E.2d at 898-99, 164 N.Y.S.2d at 703-04.
26 Id. at 145, 143 N.E.2d at 899, 164 N.Y.S.2d at 705.
27 Id. at 144-45, 143 N.E.2d at 899, 164 N.Y.S.2d at 704.
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and therefore held that the defendant architect was not liable for
damages for injuries resulting from a patent defect when the injuries
occurred to a third person not in privity of contract with the archi-
tect after the building had been completed and turned over to the
owner.
28
It is apparent that prior to the Montijo decision the courts fixed
liability upon the person who was in a position to know of and
repair the defect. In instances involving a latent defect, the contractor
who created and then concealed the defect occupied that position.
In instances involving patent defects, the owner, who is under a duty
to inspect prior to acceptance and a duty to perform supplementary
inspections thereafter, occupies the position of liability. The Montijo
rule ignores the crucial difference.
The more reasonable viewpoint seems to be that of Inman, which
holds that an architect is not liable for damages for injuries incurred
by third persons after the premises have been accepted by the owner
if the defect causing the injuries was patent to the owner of the
premises.
When the job has been completed by the independent contractor
and accepted by the owner, the independent contractor does not have
the same opportunity to discover and remedy the patent defect that
the owner of the premises has. But, where the defect generated by
the architect's negligence is latent to the owner, then it would appear
to be just to hold the architect liable since the owner of the premises,
in such case, would not have the same opportunity to discover and
correct the defect as he would have had, had the defect been patent.
The Montijo rule now makes it possible to hold an independent
contractor liable for damages for injuries resulting from his negli-
gent act that might, for example, have occurred fifty years prior to
the date of the injury, even though the defect causing the injuries
to the plaintiff (who is not in privity with the independent contrac-
tor) was patent to the owner of the premises during the fifty year
period. This extension of the rule of liability was the result of either
a deliberate intent to extend the rule (which is not the function of
an intermediate appellate court), or a failure to adequately research
the precedents.
Wesley H. Harris
28 Id. at 146, 143 N.E.2d at 900, 164 N.Y.S.2d at 705.
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